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NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioners prayed for a determination that it would
be in the best

interest of the minor child, Douglas Rex

Izatt, that his care, custody and control be vested in
them.

The natural father of the child obtained a Writ of

Habeas Corpus out of the Third Judicial District Court
and in a hearing on that matter, the Distrct Court
certified the matter back to the Juvenile Court for
findings and an order with regard to custody.

The District

Court also ordered that after the recommendation of the
Juvenile Court the case would then be returned to

the

District Court for a final hearing on the issue of custody,
pursuant to the

~frit

of Habeas Corpus.

DISPOS:;:TION IN LOWER COURT
The Juvenile Court made an order, prior to the
close of petitioner's case, dismissing part of the petition,
and later, and also prior to the close of petitioner's case,
made a final order of dismissal.

The final order of dis-

missal did not refer the matter back to the District Court
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a judgment reversing the lower court's
order of partial dismissal and the final order of dismissal.
with directions to permit petitioners to complete their case
in chief in the Juvenile Court and thereafter, following
1
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the entry of findings and a recommendation in the Juvenile
Court, for an order that the matter be referred back to the
District Court for final determination of custody pursuant
to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
STATE~!ENT

OF FACTS

Viewing the record in a light favoring the successful party below, the evidence demonstrates the following:
1.

On January 27, 1975 a Decree of Divorce awarding

custody to the natural mother of the minor child, Judith
H.

Izatt, was entered granting reasonable rights of visit-

ation in the child's natural father, Sheldon J. Izatt.
This order was entered following a disputed custody
struggle in the divorce action which was resolved on
stipulation of the parties after the parties had submitted
to and r-eceived a custody evaluation.
2.

On February 25, 1975, Judity H. Izatt, the

natural mother of the child, Douglas Rex Izatt, was killed
in an auto-pedestrian accident.
3.

On February 28, 1975, the District Juvenile

Court in and for Salt Lake County, entered an order placing
the temporary custody of the aforesaid minor child in his
maternal grandmother, Ina Hellstrom, with whom the child
and his mother had been living for more than one year prior
thereto.

This order of temporary custody was based on the
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petition of the maternal grandmother and the maternal
aunt and uncle, appellants herein.

4.

The initial petition for temporary custody

alleged, among other things:
(a) The child's mother had recently been killed
in an auto-pedestrian accident.
(b) That said 3 year old minor child had lived
continuously with his mother and maternal grandmother in the maternal grandmother's home for
more than one year immediately prior to the
filing of the petition.
(c) That custody of the child had been awarded
to his mother in a disputed divorce action.
(d) That the child's father was living with a
woman he was not married to, had no residence
of his own, and had failed to support the minor
child for six months prior to the death of his
mother.
(e) That when the child returned from visits with
his father, the child came home bruised and disturbed and had picked up using foul language. (T. 220 Pictzd
(f) That a home evaluation should be made to
determine the most suitable home for the child.
5.

On March 10, 1975 a Writ of Habeas Corpus

was issued directing that the minor child be brought
before the Third Judicial Court and dealt with according
to law and a hearing was set for March 21, 1975.
6.

On March 13, 1975 a pre-trial conference was

held in the Juvenile Court on the petition of the
maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and uncle,
appellants herein.

the

At that time the court appointed

Michael Stead, Deputy County Attorney, as guardian ad
litem for the child and also as attorney for the child.

3
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The Juvenile Court continued custody in the maternal
grandmother pursuant to the order of February 28, 1975,
and continued the pre-trial to March 24, 1975, pending a
determination in the District Court on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
7.

On March 21, 1975 a hearing on the Writ of

Habeas Corpus was held resulting in an order as follows:

8.

1.

The question of the custody of the minor
child, Douglas Rex Izatt, is certified to
the District Juvenile Court in and for Salt
Lake County for determination pursuant to
55-10-78 U.C.A. as amended.

2.

That the Writ of Habeas Corpus herein is
continued without date.

3.

That following the hearing in Juvenile Court,
the Juvenile Court shall make findings and
an order with regard to custody and refer
the matter back to the District Court for
final hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

4.

The petitioner's motion that the temporary
order of the Juvenile Court vesting custody
in respondents be vacated is denied.

5.

That there is no continuing jurisdiction
in the divorce action, Civil No. D-13106,
with regard to the question of custody,
as referred to in 55-10-78 U.C.A., as
amended in 1971, due to the death of one
of the parties thereto, Judith H. Izatt,
defendant therein.

On March 24, 1975 the pre-trial was held in

the Juvenile Court and Judge Larson observed with regard
thereto,

4
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"Now if we are riding the District Court horse
that doesn't become critical, I suppose, but I
just evaluate what information is available and
make a recommendation to the District Court.
That doesn't turn on the question of neglect, it
seems to me.
It turns on what appears at this
point. I suppose it would be in the best
interest of the child, wouldn't it? (T.13,P.12-19)
At this hearing the State of Utah asked leave to
withdraw and the same was permitted by Judge Larson.

The

minor child was three years old at the time.
9.

Following the hearing on the Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the District Court, at which time the maternal
grandmother had temporary custody of the minor child by
virtue of the Order of Temporary Placement of the Juvenile
Court, dated February 23, 1975, the natural father was
permitted to visit with the child once a week, and custody
was continued in the maternal grandmother.
10.

On May 20, 1975, a hearing was held on Petitioners

Motion For A Psychological Examination of the minor child
and the natural father.

The petition was joined in by the

attorney for the child, Michael Stead, and the court granted
the motion.

The Court ordered the maternal aunt and uncle,

appellants herein, to pay for the psychological examinations
11.

On March 28, 1975 the maternal grandmother of

the child died of a heart attack.
12.

On April 1, 1975, the Court placed the temporarv

custody and guardianship of the minor child with the
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5

natural father,

subject to the protective supervision of

the Division of Family Services and advised the maternal
aunt and uncle to turn the child over to the father.

The

Court further advised the father of the child to permit the
maternal aunt and uncle to visit with the child and that
request was frustrated and specifically thwarted by the
father's counsel who stated that he had directed his client
not to let them visit with the child.

13.

(T.

208)

On August 8, 1975 a motion to amend the petition

and for a psychological examination of the natural father's
present wife came on for hearing.

!1ichael Stead, the

attorney and guardian for the child joined in the petition
and Dr. H. Max Cutler testified with regard to the advisability thereof.

The court granted the motion and ordered

petitioners to pay the expenses of the psychological
examination as well as the psychological examinations on
the father of the child.
The amended petition alleged new information
received as a result of the psychological examinations of
the minor child and his father.

The new matter alleged is

as follows:
The said Sheldon J. Izatt is unfit and/or
incompetent by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child as follows:

6
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CONDUCT
(a) The father has neglected and/or abused the
child physically on more than one occasion.
(b) The father's conduct is both amoral and
asocial.
(c) The father has set an example of prevarication, immorality and vulgarity, which is
seriously detrimental to the welfare of the
child.
(d) The wife of the natural father of said
child, who has the actual care, custody and
control of the child for most of his waking
hours, has threatened the boy with castration.
This extremely negative approach to discipline
can have serious psychological consequences
in terms of severe sexual and emotional conflicts
for years to come.
CONDITION
(a) ·The father has massive hostility, expressed
both in acting out and projecting the same in
others.
The child becomes the victim of direct
hostility as well as being the object of projected hostility.
(b) The father is of significantly lower
intelligence than the child, and it is more
probable than not that the child will not
develop to his potential, if custody remains
with his father.
(c) The father's present wife, and her five
children, from two previous marriages, are of
significantly lower intelligence than said child
and it is more probable than not, that the child
will not develop to his potential if he continues
to reside with said persons.
14.

On October 17, 1975 the raatter came on for trial

and petitioners called as their first witness the natural
father of the child at which time the court ruled that
the petitioners would have to subpeona the natural father
in order to make him a witness.

7

The natural father did not
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appear on the first day of trial nor at any other time
nor at any of the motions in the Juvenile Court.
15.

On the first day of the trial and before the

close of evidence, the natural father, by and through
his attorney, made a motion to dismiss which was granted
as to paragraphs la - le under conduct of petitioners'
amended petition.

The motion was taken under advisement

and at the time of the hearing Judge Larson observed as
follows:
"One thing that bothers me is that Mr. Goodwill
had not rested. If he's got his evidence in on
these points, then I could make a ruling."
(T. 179, L. 7-9)
Opposing counsel then gave as his reason for a
prohibition against calling the father of the child as
petitioners' witness that the court should assume what
he would say before he said it, when counsel for the father
states as follows:
Your Honor, as a matter of common sense, the
defendant assuming whether he is guilty or
not guilty, whether he is a liar or not,
Mr. Goodwill is never going to be able to
prove that he is a liar and assuming that he
is telling the truth, he is certainly going
to deny neglecting, beating, and living with
a woman. If that's the rest of his case it's
no case.
(T. 181, L. 7-13.)
16.

On December 1, 1975, the Court entered an order

of partial dismissal, based on counsel for the father's motion,
as the paragraph la through le under conduct, of petitioners'
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amended petition, without first giving petitioner a chance
to examine the natural father as a witness and continued
the matter for a trial as to paragraph ld conditions and
la through le under conduct to December 15, 1975.

That

date was striken and the matter was reset for trial to the
date of April 15, 1976.
17.

On April 15, 1976, counsel for petitioner

appeared in Juvenile Court with the intent of completing
his case in chief, but instead,

the court permitted counsel

for the natural father to put on a witness in support of
his renewed motion to dismiss the remaining portions of
the petition.
18.

During the hearing of April 15, 1976, the

Court, without notice or hearing, stated that a Mr. John
Soltis had been appointed as guardian for the child and
Mr. Soltis, it was determined had theretofore met with
the attorney for the natural father and based on the
information given to him by the attorney for the natural
father joined in a motion to dismiss.

This motion was

made, once again, prior to the close of petitioners' case.
Petitioner had been unable at this time to
put on the expert witness, Dr. Victor B. Cline, who had
examined the child at the expense of petitioner, and had
also been unable to examine either

the

father or the

9
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father's new wife.
The Court permitted the natural father to
examine a social worker in support of his motion to dismiss.
The social worker had visited the home of the natural father.
The social worker made many recommendations and statements
which would require her to have been established as an
expert witness.

The Court then granted petitioners' motion

to strike all of the social worker's testimony, except that
testimony that related to her actual observations of the
child or of the home of the father and the conditions
therein.
Counsel for petitioner objected to the
appointment of Mr. John Soltis, as attorney for the child,
on the basis that said attorney had met with opposing
counsel prior to his official appointment, there had
been no notice of his appointment, and he had not spoken
with counsel for petitioner nor investigated any of the
facts from the standpoint of petitioners' theory, nor
had he been present at any of the prior hearings, and on
the basis that he was not acting in the best interests of
the child.

Over objection, the Court appointed Mr. Soltis

guardian for the child and further granted the motion to
dismiss petitioners' entire petition.

10
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POINT I
THE GRANTING OF A SECOND MID-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITIONERS' AMENDED PETITION BEFORE THE CLOSE OF PETITIONERS'
CASE IN CHIEF IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The attorney for the child, Michael Stead, was a joint
signator with counsel for petitioner in his Motion to Amend
the petition to include conduct or condition seriously
detrimental to the child based on subsequent psychological
examinations of the natural father and the minor child and
a threatened castration of the minor child by the child's
stepmother.
During the trial and before petitioner had completed
its case in chief, counsel for the natural father made a
motion to dismiss petitioners' amended petition.

Judge

Larson questioned the propriety of granting a motion to
dismiss before petitioners had rested their case and he
observed as follows:
"One thin~ that bothers me is that Mr. Goodwill had
not reste . If he's
his evidence in on these
points ten I cou
ma ea ruing.
T.
, L.
to 9)
At the time of the motion to dismiss the amended
petition, Michael Stead, the court appointed attorney for
the minor child opposed the motion to dismiss with regard
to the portions of the amended petition which related to
the pyschological examinations of the father and the child
as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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". . . (H) owever, I am concerned about the
emotional and mental ability of this father
to adefuately take care of the child and
would ike more information as to that . . "
On the 1st day of December,

1975, the court

entered an order partially dismissing petitioners'
amended petition and denied the same with regard to the
condition which related to the psychological examinations
performed on the father, the child and the step-mother
and with regard to the alleged conduct of the child's
stepmother as to a threat to castrate the child.
The case had been continued for trial to December 15th,
1975 but was re-set for trial for April 15th, 1976.

On

April 15, 1976 Mr. John Soltis, a Deputy County Attorney,
was appointed guardian ad litem for the child.

Mr.

Soltis had met with counsel for the father prior to the
hearing but had not been officially appointed by the court,
nor had there been notice or hearing as to his appointment.
It was admitted that he had not been present at the prior
hearings nor during the trial itself.

Mr. Soltis admitted

that he had spoken with counsel for the father, with the
child and a case worker, but that he had not spoken with
the natural father, had not spoken with the step-mother, and
had not spoken with any of petitioners' expert witnesses
nor had he spoken with petitioners' counsel.

12
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Petitioner's counsel objected to Mr. Soltis appearing
for the child at which time the court appointed him
ad lit em for the child,

guardian

(T. 182, L. 26) did not appoint him

attorney for the child, and Mr. Soltis joined in counsel
for the father's motion to dismiss the petition.

This was

the same motion that had been denied in part on December 1,

1975.
At the time of the granting of the motion to dismiss
the petition in total, petitioner still had not been able
to finish its case in chief.

Petitioner had paid for three

psychological examinations and engaged and paid for the
services of two well respected psychologists, Dr. H. Max
Cutler and Dr. Victor B. Cline.

Petitioner had not had

an opportunity to examine as hostile witnesses, the father
of the child, and the step-mother of the child; or the
psychologist who examined the child Dr. Victor B. Cline,
despite the fact that counsel for the father had stipulated
that Dr. Cline be permitted to testify and lay the ground
work and basis for Dr. Cutler's testimony, and also to
testify independently based on his examination of the
minor child.

(T. 157, L. 1-11)

Rule 41 (b), U.R.C.P., provides that,
"After the laintiff, in an
the court without a
resentation o
without waiving

tried b'
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t

e

Since the motion to dismiss was granted prior to the
close of petitioner's evidence, and before petitioner had
the opportunity to examine a number of witnesses, the court
should reverse the decision of the Juvenile Court pursuant
to Rule 41 (b), U.R.C.P. and remand the case back for
further proceedings in conformity with the court's opinion.
The order of partial dismissal of petitioners'
amended petition, dated December 1, 1975, should be
reversed and remanded with the same directions and for
the same reasons.
POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN DISmssrnG PETITIONERS'
PETITION AND IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS AND AN ORDER
REFERRING THE MATTER BACK TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR FINAL
DETERMINATION ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS ORDERED BY
THE DISTRICT COURT.
When the natural father of the minor child filed
his Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court a petition
was pending in the Juvenile Court.

The petitioners and

the maternal grandmother had filed the petition in the
Juvenile Court and the Court had granted temporary custody
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the maternal grandmother.
The District Court certified the question of custody
to the Juvenile Court with an order that findings be
entered and that the case be referred back to the District
Court for final resolution of the

custody issue as it

related to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
55-10-78, U.C.A. as amended, provides that
" . . . Nothing contained in this act shall deprive
the District Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian for a child, nor of jurisdiction to determine
the custody of a child upon Writ of Habeas Corpus .
provided that in case a petition involving the same
child is endin in the Juvenile Court .
. , the
District Court s a
certi
the uestion o custod
to the Juvenile Court
etermination.
A District Court may at any time decline to hass
u on a uestion of custod and ma certif t e
uestion to t e Juveni e Court or etermination
Emphasis a e
In re State ex rel Thornton, 18 U. 2d 297, 422 P.2d
199, (1967) the court defined the word "Determination" as
used in the aforesaid statute as follows:
The word determination in the statute providing that
" . . . a District Court may at any time decline to
pass upon a question of custody and may certify that
question to the Juvenile Court for determination
or recommendation, does not mean that once a case is
referred to the Juvenile Court, the decision of that
Court is final." [Emphasis added.]
The District Court in connection with the natural
father's Writ of Habeas Corpus certified the question
of custody to the Juvenile Court for findings and a
15
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recommendation.

The Juvenile Court then dismissed

petitioners' petition but made no findings, entered
merely a temporary order of custody in the natural father,
not a final order of custody, and did not refer the matter
back to the District Court for a final determination on
the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided in the order of
Judge Maurice Harding signed on the 28th day of April, 1975,
and as directed inSS-10-78 U.C.A. as amended.(Statement of Facts P.4)
Since the order of dismissal of the Juvenile Court
was not only contrary to the aforesaid statute, but also
contrary to the order which certified the custody issue
back to the Juvenile Court, the order of Judge Larson
should be reversed, the matter should be remanded for
further proceedings in order that petitioners may complete
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is completed, findings should be entered and a recoIIllllendation made
to the District Court for a final determination on the Writ
of Habeas Corpus.

16
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POINT III

THE APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM
FOR THE CHILD WAS ERROR.
On April 15, 1976 the matter came on for further
trial and a Mr. John Soltis appeared and said Mr. Stead,
attorney and guardian ad litem for the child had left
the County Attorney's office and that Mr. Soltis replaced
him and took over his cases.

(T. 182 L. 11-12)

Petitioners' counsel inquired of the Court whether or
not Mr. Soltis had been appointed to represent the minor
child.

The Court then observed:
I don't know that there was action appointing
him. He took over Mr. Stead's work. (T. 1821.9-10)
Petitioners' counsel inquired of the Court as to

whether or not Mr. Stead had been appointed guardian ad
litem and attorney for the child in his individual capacity
or as a Deputy County Attorney.

Petitioners' counsel

inquired as follows:
As I understand it, your Honor, he was not
appointed as a Deputy County Attorney, that
is the County Attorney's office was not
appointed to represent the child, but ~r.
Stead in his individual capacity was appointed
to represent the child. (T. 182 L. 13-17)
The Court responded:
That is right is there any objection to my
appointing Mr. Soltis at this time to
represent the child? (T. 182 L. 18-19)
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Petitioners' counsel objected on the basis that
there had been no notice and that he had never had an
opportunity to confer with Mr. Soltis.

Mr. Soltis had

conferred with and agreed to join with the father's
attorney in a motion to dismiss.

He did not even attempt

to confer with counsel for petitioner.
The Court, over objection, appointed Mr. Soltis
guardian ad litem, but not attorney for the child when
it observed:
The Court will appoint Mr. Soltis as guardian
ad litem.
The matter before the Court is
Mr. Schwobe's motion to dismiss. (T.1821. 26-27)
The second day of trial had been continued twice due
to Dr. H. Max Cutler's having suffered a heart attack and
finally when the matter came on for the second day of
trial on April 15, 1976, petitioners were denied an
opportunity to finish their case in chief and the hearing
was converted into one to determine the father's motion
to dismiss.
55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated as amended provides that:
The Court may appoint counsel without such
request if it deems representation necessary
to nrotect the interest of the child.
[Emphasis added.]
In the instant case it is submitted that Mr. Soltis
was improperly appointed, as one who does not obtain
information about both sides of a case in an impartial
manner to determine what is in the best interests of the
child,Sponsored
cannot
be
acting
in
theof Museum
bestand Library
interests
by the S.J. be
Quinneysaid
Law Library.to
Funding
for digitization
provided by
the Institute
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

of the child nor to protect the interests of the child.

In

the instant case the former attorney for the child, Michael
Stead, joined in the motion for psychological examinations
of the father,

the child and the stepmother of the child.

He also observed with regard to his concern about the
emotional condition of the father:
I'm concerned about the emotional and mental
abilit of the father to ade uatel take care
o the chi
and would like more in ormation
about that. (T. 179 L. l-3)
More information about the emotional and mental ability
of the father to care for the child was not presented to
the Court, as before any further witnesses were sworn and
examined, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.
In a case such as this one where the amended petition
alleges that (1) the stepmother threatened to castrate the
minor child,

(2) the father had abused the child,

father had massive hostility,

(3) the

(4) the father is of signif-

icantly lower intelligence than the child and it is more
probable than not that the child will not develop to his
potential, if custody remains with his father, and (5)
that the father's present wife, and her five children
from two previous marriages, are of significantly lower
intelligence than said child and it is more probable than
not, that the child will not develop to his potential if
he continues to reside with said persons, it is respectfull'
submitted that an attorney who fails to speak with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

father, the stepmother, the attorney for petitioners, and
petitioners' two expert witnesses, is not acting to protect
the interest of the child pursuant to 55-10-96, U.C.A.
annotated as amended.

The appointment of Mr. Soltis

was, therefore, reversible error.

CONCLUSION
The order of partial dismissal and the order
dismissing petitioners' petition in its entirety should
be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further
proceedings in order that the petitioners may complete
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is
completed, findings should be entered and a recommendation
made to the District Court for a final determination on
the Writ of Habeas Corpus as it relates to the custody
issue.

Respectfully submitted,

fJLtlix@t.11

David A. Goodwill
Attorney for Petitioners and
Appellants Ben and Janet Stowell
455 E. 4th South, #50
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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